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WORKERS' COMPENSATION-A DEPARTURE FROM PRE-
CEDENT OR PAST ERROR CORRECTED?-Rutledge v.
Tultex Corp./Kings Yarn, 308 N.C. 85, 301 S.E.2d 359 (1983).
INTRODUCTION
Under the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act' em-
ployers must compensate their employees who are unable to earn
wages when disability results from accidental injuries 2 or occupa-
tional diseases.3 Employee disability or death under the Act is only
compensable when it bears a causal relation to the employment.4
Causation has been particularly difficult to prove for North Caro-
lina textile workers suffering from chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease or byssinosis.5 This problem arises because the disease may
result from occupational factors, non-occupational factors or both.
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to 122 (1979 & Supp. 1983).
2. Id. § 97-2(6) (Supp. 1983).
3. Id. § 97-52 (1979).
4. Vause v. Vause Farm Equip. Co., 233 N.C. 88, 63 S.E.2d 173 (1983);
Duncan v. City of Charlotte, 234 N.C. 86, 66 S.E.2d 22 (1951).
5. North Carolina Case law uses the terms "chronic obstructive lung disease,"
"chronic obstructive pulmonary disease" and sometimes "byssinosis" interchange-
ably to describe lung impairment of the textile worker. In a Yale University study
on the epidemiology of lung impairment in textile workers, the authors argue that
the distinction between these terms is merely one of semantics. These are actually
two stages of the same disease syndrome, byssinosis. (There is no distinction be-
tween chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and chronic obstructive lung dis-
ease. Both are terms to describe the same level of impairment.) There is little
doubt that both are caused by exposure to respirable cotton dust in textile mills.
Bouhuys, et al, Epidemiology of Chronic Lung Disease in a Cotton Mill Commu-
nity, Service Vol. 5 of Traumatic Medicine and Surgery for the Attorney 607,
reprinted from Lung-And International Journal on Lungs, Airways, and
Breathing, 154(3): 167-86 (1977).
The disease is commonly known as "brown lung disease" or "cotton mill fe-
ver." STEDMON'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 207 (4th ed. 1976). See also Hansel v. Sher-
man Textiles, 304 N.C. 44, 60-61, 283 S.E.2d 101, 110 (1981) (Exum, J. concurring
in result). For further discussion of the disease and causation see Hearings Before
The Subcommittee on Labor Standards of the Committee on Education and La-
bor, House of Representatives, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); 4A ATTORNEY'S TEXT-
BOOK OF MEDICINE ch. 205E (R. Gray 3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter referred to as AT-
TORNEY'S TEXTBOOK].
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Components of the disease may be the inhalation of cotton dust,'
an occupational factor, and chronic bronchitis, emphysema,
asthma or cigarette smoking, non-occupational factors.7 Any com-
bination of these components may contribute to the disease's de-
velopment, and it is virtually impossible to distinguish the effects
of byssinosis from other lung problems even through biopsy or
autopsy.8
The problem faced by the North Carolina courts in these lung
disease cases has been whether to compensate the worker for the
entire disability or to apportion damages and compensate only the
portion resulting from the employment. Recent North Carolina
cases have applied the apportionment rule. In Rutledge v. Tultex
Corp./Kings Yarn10 the North Carolina Supreme Court once again
confronted the causation issue involved in a byssinosis case. The
court held that chronic obstructive lung disease may be an occupa-
tional disease making the entire disability compensable if the
worker's exposure to cotton dust significantly contributed to or was
a significant causal factor in the disease's development."
This note examines Rutledge in view of the North Carolina
Workers' Compensation Act and North Carolina precedent inter-
preting the Act in the occupational disease area. It focuses on
whether the standard adopted by the court is consistent with pre-
cedent and the purposes of the Act. Finally, it considers the effect
of this standard on the byssinosis victim in proving the necessary
causation for a compensable occupational disease.
THE CASE
Plaintiff worked in four textile mills holding various positions
6. For a discussion of the manufacture of cotton and the development of bys-
sinosis see 4A ArORNEY'S TEXTBOOK 205E.01.
7. See supra note 5. For a discussion of dual causation of occupational dis-
ease see 1B LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 41.64 (1983) [hereinafter
referred to as LARSON].
8. Hansel v. Sherman Textiles, 304 N.C. 44, 62, 283 S.E.2d 101, 111 (1981)
(Exum, J. concurring in result). For a discussion of the symptomology and etiol-
ogy of byssinosis see ArTORNEY'S TEXTBOOK ch. 205E.
9. Morrison v. Burlington Indus., 304 N.C. 1, 282 S.E.2d 458 (1981); Hansel v.
Sherman Textiles, 304 N.C. 44, 283 S.E.2d 101 (1981); Walston v. Burlington In-
dus., 304 N.C. 670, 285 S.E.2d 822 (1982). For a full discussion of these cases see
BACKGROUND and accompanying notes.
10. 308 N.C. 85, 301 S.E.2d 359 (1983).
11. Id. at 101, 301 S.E.2d at 369.
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from 1953 until her retirement in 1979.12 From October, 1976, until
January, 1979, she worked as a winder and then as a spinner in
defendant's North Carolina mill where she was exposed to respira-
ble cotton dust.13 Plaintiff smoked cigarettes for approximately
twenty-nine years at a rate of one pack per day.' In 1969 or 1970,
she developed a cough related to her presence at work.' 5 Her short-
ness of breath became severe in December, 1976, causing her to
miss work on several occasions.' 6 In 1979 plaintiff retired and filed
a claim with the North Carolina Industrial Commission alleging
that she had contracted an occupational disease due to her expo-
sure to cotton dust in her employment.'
At the hearings before the Industrial Commission, Dr. Charles
D. Williams, Jr., a specialist in pulmonary disease and a member of
the Commission's Occupational Disease Panel, 8 testified as to
plaintiff's condition. Dr. Williams testified that plaintiff suffered
from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease with elements of pul-
monary emphysema and chronic bronchitis.'9 This condition dis-
abled plaintiff from performing all but sedentary work because of
her reaction to cotton dust and other irritants.2 0 Dr. Williams' tes-
timony indicated that plaintiff's exposure to cotton dust in her em-
ployment was "probably" a cause of her lung impairment but that
cigarette smoking also may have caused the impairment.2'
After hearing evidence for claimant and defendant, Deputy
Commissioner Denson made findings that plaintiff failed to prove
her employment caused her impairment and she contracted chron-
ic obstructive pulmonary disease as a result of any exposure while
12. Id. at 87, 301 S.E.2d at 361, 362. The plaintiff worked in the following
textile mills: (1) United Merchants in Buffalo, S.C., from 1953 until 1971 as a
weaver; (2) Milliken at Union, S.C., from 1971 to 1973 as a dry cleaner; (3) Aleo
Manufacturing in Rockingham, N.C., from 1975 to 1976 as a weaver; and (4) for
defendant from October, 1976 to January, 1979 as a winder and then as a spinner.
13. Id. at 87, 301 S.E.2d at 362.
14. Id. at 87, 301 S.E.2d at 361.
15. Id. at 87, 301 S.E.2d at 362.
16. Id.
17. Rutledge v. Tultex Corp./Kings Yarn, 56 N.C. App. 345, 346-347, 289
S.E.2d 72, 72-73 (1982).
18. Rutledge v. Tultex Corp./Kings Yarn, 308 N.C. at 112, 301 S.E.2d at 375
(Meyer, J. dissenting 1983).
19. Id. at 92, 301 S.E.2d at 364.
20. Id. at 87, 301 S.E.2d at 362.
21. Id. at 101, 301 S.E.2d at 369.
1984]
3
Hartman: Workers' Compensation - A Departure from Precedent or Past Error
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1984
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
working for the defendant.22 The Full Commission adopted his
findings and entered an Opinion and Award denying compensa-
tion.23 The court of appeals determined that the Industrial Com-
mission erred in requiring plaintiff to show that her last employ-
ment caused her disease.24 This error, however, was considered
harmless by the court because there was insufficient evidence
before the Commission to prove that plaintiff contracted an occu-
pational disease.25
On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court agreed that the
Industrial Commission applied the wrong legal standards in the
decision.26 However, the court ruled that the court of appeals erred
in concluding there was no evidence that plaintiff contracted an
occupational disease.2 7 Over the dissent of Justice Meyer, 8 the
court held that plaintiffs chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
could be an occupational disease if the employment exposed her to
a greater risk of contracting the disease than the public generally.
Also, the exposure to cotton dust in the employment must have
"significantly contributed to or was a significant causal factor in
the disease's development." 9 This standard would support an
award for total disability compensation even though non-occupa-
tional factors also significantly contributed to the disease's devel-
22. Id. at 88, 301 S.E.2d at 362.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 90, 301 S.E.2d at 363. The court held that a claimant need not
show that conditions of employment with defendant caused or significantly con-
tributed to her disease. To receive compensation for an occupational disease
plaintiff need show (1) that she has a compensable occupational disease, and (2)
that she was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease in defendant's
employment. "Last injuriously exposed" means "an exposure which proximately
augmented the disease to any extend, however slight." Id. at 89, 301 S.E.2d at
362.
27. Id. at 90, 301 S.E.2d at 363.
28. Id. at 109, 301 S.E.2d at 374 (Meyer, J. dissenting). Justice Meyer as-
serted that the majority had subtly reversed three decisions of the North Carolina
Supreme Court: Morrison v. Burlington Indus., 304 N.C. 1, 282 S.E.2d 458 (1981);
Hansel v. Sherman Textiles, 304 N.C. 44, 283 S.E.2d 101 (1981); and Walston v.
Burlington Indus., 304 N.C. 670, 285 S.E.2d 822 (1982). All three of these cases
applied the apportionment rule requiring the Industrial Commission to apportion
damages allowing recovery only for disability caused by the employment.
29. Id. at 101, 301 S.E.2d at 369. The court defined significant as "having or
likely to have influence or effect: deserving to be considered: important, weighty,
notable." Id. at 101, 301 S.E.2d at 370.
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opment.30 The supreme court then remanded the case to the In-
dustrial Commission to determine whether plaintiff contracted an
occupational disease using the standard adopted by the court."1
BACKGROUND
To understand the impact of Rutledge on occupational disease
claims in North Carolina, the history and purposes s of the North
Carolina Workers' Compensation Act must be examined. The de-
velopment of occupational disease legislation and interpretation of
this legislation must be particularly scrutinized to understand the
causation issue involved in byssinosis cases.
A. Disability Compensation in North Carolina
Disability compensation under the Act is determined by the
worker's incapacity to earn wages.33 The purpose of disability com-
pensation is to provide financial assistance for employees whose
means of sustenance have been reduced or destroyed." Disability
compensation is not designed to compensate for pain and suffer-
ing"5 nor is the Workers' Compensation Act designed to provide
general health insurance benefits.36 Thus, if there is no loss of wage
30. Id. at 107, 301 S.E.2d at 373.
31. Id. at 108, 301 S.E.2d at 373. After Rutledge was remanded to the Indus-
trial Commission, the parties settled the case. Thus, the Industrial Commission
never determined whether plaintiff's chronic obstructive pulmonary disease was
an occupational disease.
32. The North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act contains no specific
statement of purpose. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to 122 (1979 & Supp. 1983). Pur-
poses of the Act have evolved through case law interpretation.
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-2(9) (1979). This section defines disability as "in-
capacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at
the time of injury in the same or any other employment." Although this provision
specifically addresses "incapacity because of injury," it is also applicable to occu-
pational disease claims via N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-52 (1979). This provision defines
disablement or death from occupational disease as the "happening of an injury by
accident."
34. Branham v. Denny Roll & Panel Co., 223 N.C. 233, 25 S.E.2d 865 (1943).
35. Id. There are provisions in the North Carolina Workers' Compensation
Act Designed to compensate loss of body members (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31(17)
(1979)) or disfigurement (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31(22) (1979)) even though there is
no loss of earning capacity. These are not disabilities under the Act. For a discus-
sion of wage loss provisions versus provisions for medical incapacity see 2 LARSON
§ 57.
36. 203 N.C. 233, 236, 25 S.E.2d 865, 867.
19841
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earning capacity, there is no disability recovery under the Act.3"
To establish a compensable disability under the Act, the
claimant must prove a causal relation between the employment
and the injury 8 or disease.39 The hazards and conditions of em-
ployment need not be the exclusive cause of the disability to be
compensable under the Act.40 Problems arise when disability is
caused by both occupational and non-occupational factors. This
problem is particularly prevalent in occupational disease claims.41
B. Occupational Disease Claims in North Carolina
The original North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act 2 had
no provision for occupational diseases resulting from employ-
ment.' In 1935, the General Assembly added an occupational dis-
ease provision to the Act. 4 This provision limited recovery to a list
37. Disability under the Act may be total or partial. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-29
(Supp. 1983) provides compensation for the employee totally incapacitated to
earn wages. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-30 (Supp. 1983) provides compensation for the
employee partially incapacitated to earn wages.
38. Vause v. Vause Farm Equip. Co., 233 N.C. 88, 91, 63 S.E.2d 173, 175
(1951)("the injury must spring from the employment or have its origin therein").
39. Duncan v. City of Charlotte, 234 N.C. 86, 91, 66 S.E.2d 22, 25 (1951).
This case established that the addition of occupational disease coverage to the
Act did not relax the necessity to prove causation between employment and in-
jury or disease. In fact, it is this requirement of causal relation that keeps the
Workers' Compensation Act from becoming general health insurance coverage.
40. Vause v. Vause Farm Equip. Co., 233 N.C. 88, 92, 66 S.E.2d 173, 175
(1951)(hazards of employment do not have to be the sole cause of worker's in-
jury); Humphries v. Cone Mills Corp., 52 N.C. App. 612, 614, 279 S.E.2d 56, 58,
cert. denied, 304 N.C. 390, 285 S.E.2d 832 (1981).
41. For a discussion of dual causation in occupational disease claims see 1B
LARSON § 41.64.
42. 1929 N.C. Pub. Laws, ch. 117.
43. Id. Occupational disease coverage has always lagged far behind accident
coverage under workers' compensation acts in the United States. For an explana-
tion see 1B LARSON § 41.30.
44. 1935 N.C. Pub. Laws, ch. 123 The original Act covered only "injury by
accident" and did not specifically cover occupational diseases. 1929 N.C. Pub.
Laws, ch. 120. The North Carolina General Assembly amended the Act in 1935 to
include coverage for occupational diseases in response to the Supreme Court deci-
sion in McNeely v. Asbestos Co., 206 N.C. 568, 174 S.E.2d 509 (1934). In the case,
a worker developed pulmonary asbestosis due to his exposure to asbestos dust in
his employment. Id. at 574, 174 S.E.2d at 512. McNeely sued in a common law
action for negligence. Id. at 569, 174 S.E.2d at 509. The court found that the
asbestosis resulted from an injury by accident within the meaning of the Work-
men's Compensation Act. Id. at 574, 174 S.E.2d at 512. This left McNeely without
104 [Vol. 7:99
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of scheduled occupational diseases.45
The current occupational disease section also contains a list of
scheduled occupational diseases.4" Subsection thirteen, however,
broadens the scope of recovery by including compensation for:
[a]ny disease, other than hearing loss covered in another subdivi-
sion of this section, which is proven to be due to causes and con-
ditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular
trade, occupation or employment, but excluding all ordinary dis-
eases of life to which the general public is equally exposed outside
of the employment. 47
In Booker v. Duke Medical Center,48 the North Carolina Su-
preme Court first interpreted this subsection and defined its scope.
The court allowed a lab technician suffering from serum hepatitis
to recover under the subsection.49 In reaching the decision, the
Court found that the disease was characteristic of the employment
because there was a recognizable link between the occupation and
an increased risk of contracting the disease. 50 The disease was "pe-
culiar to" the employment because the conditions of employment
resulted in a "hazard which distinguishes it from the usual run of
occupations and is in excess of that attending employment in
general."51
a remedy because he could not file a claim within the time period allowed for
recovery. See Note, Workmen's Compensation-Development of North Carolina
Occupational Disease Coverage, 7 WAK FOREST L. REv. 341, 344 (1971).
45. Id. For a discussion of the development of occupational disease compen-
sation in North Carolina see supra note 44.
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-53 (1979).
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-53(13)(1979). This is the provision as amended in
1971. Prior to the amendment, subsection thirteen provided compensation for:
infection or inflammation of the skin, eyes, or other external contact sur-
faces or oral or nasal cavities or any other internal or external organ or
organs of the body due to irritating oils, cutting compounds, chemical
dust, liquids, fumes, gases or vapors, and any other materials or
substances.
1963 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 965.
48. 297 N.C. 458, 256 S.E.2d 189 (1979). The court stated that the purpose of
the amendment was to bring North Carolina in line with the majority of states
providing comprehensive coverage for occupational diseases. For further explana-
tion of this case and its effect on occupational disease legislation see Note, Redefi-
nition of Occupational Disease and the Applicable Compensation Statute, 16
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 288 (1980).
49. Id. at 480, 156 S.E.2d at 203.
50. Id. at 472, 256 S.E.2d at 198.
51. Id. at 473, 256 S.E.2d at 199.
19841
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Additionally, the Booker court recognized the final require-
ment necessary to establish a compensable occupational disease
under subsection thirteen-causation.2 The disease must be inci-
dent to or the result of the particular employment to be compensa-
ble under the Act. 3 The court realized that proof of this causal
connection must be based on circumstantial evidence and listed
three factors that could be considered by the fact finder:
(1) the extent of exposure to the disease or disease causing
agents during employment;
(2) the extent of exposure outside of employment; and
(3) the absence of the disease prior to the work related exposure
as shown by the employee's medical history. 4
While the court defined the elements of an occupational disease
under subsection thirteen, it failed to address the difficult problem
of dual causation in occupational disease cases.
C. Apportionment of Disability Compensation
When disability is the result of occupational and non-occupa-
tional factors, the courts face the problem of whether to allow com-
pensation for the entire disability or only the portion resulting
from the employment. Apportionment of damages refers to prorat-
ing liability between the employer and employee when a pre-ex-
isting condition is a causal factor in the resulting disability.6
The North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act contains an
apportionment provision 6 In Schrum v. Catawba Upholstering
Co., 7 this provision was interpreted to limit this apportionment
provision to prevent double compensation when the claimant has
suffered a prior compensable injury. Thus, the provision is inap-
plicable to prior personal disabilities unrelated to employment.
52. Id at 475, 256 S.E.2d at 200.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 476, 256 S.E.2d at 200.
55. There are actually three forms of apportionment: (1) between successive
employers or carriers when final disability is traceable under two or more of them;
(2) between an employer and a second injury fund; and (3) between employer and
employee himself, when a prior personal disability contributes to the final disa-
bling result. 2 LARSON § 59.20.
56. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-33 (1979).
57. 214 N.C. 353, 199 S.E. 385 (1938).
58. Id. at 355, 199 S.E. at 387.
[Vol. 7:99
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1. The Aggravation Principle
In Anderson v. Northwestern Motor Co.,59 the North Carolina
Supreme Court stated:
[wihen an employee afflicted with a pre-existing disease or infir-
mity suffers a personal injury by accident arising out of and in
the course of his employment, and such injury materially acceler-
ates or aggravates the pre-existing disease or infirmity and thus
proximately contributes to the death or disability of the em-
ployee, the injury is compensable, even though it would not have
caused death or disability to a normal person.6 0
This is known as the aggravation principle. The plaintiff in Ander-
son was denied compensation under this principle even though the
accident aggravated or accelerated his pre-existing condition be-
cause there was no loss of wage earning capacity. 1 In Self v. Starr-
Davis Co.,62 this principle was applied to an occupational disease
claim for death benefits. The deceased suffered from asbestosis
caused by his employment." The deceased also suffered from a
malignant brain tumor unrelated to his employment." The court
of appeals awarded compensation finding that the decedent's
death was aggravated or accelerated by the presence of asbestosis,
an occupational disease. The important distinction made by the
court was that death was aggravated or accelerated by the occupa-
tional disease and not the tumor."
Total disability benefits have also been awarded to claimants
suffering only partial disability when factors such as age, education
and work experience combine with the injury or occupational dis-
ease to render the claimant unable to earn wages. In Mabe v.
North Carolina Granite Corp.,16 the North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals upheld an award for total disability when a claimant suffered
only forty percent incapacity due to an occupational disease, silico-
sis.67 When the occupational disease was considered with factors of
59. 233 N.C. 372, 64 S.E.2d 265 (1951).
60. Id. at 374, 64 S.E.2d at 265.
61. Id. at 376, 64 S.E.2d at 268.
62. 13 N.C. App. 694, 187 S.E.2d 466 (1972).
63. Id. at 695, 187 S.E.2d at 467.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 699, 187 S.E.2d at 470.
66. 15 N.C. App. 253, 189 S.E.2d 804 (1972).
67. Id. at 255, 189 S.E.2d at 806.
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age, education and work experience6 1 the claimant was totally inca-
pacitated to earn wages. 9 Similarly, in Little v. Anson County
Schools Food Service,70 the North Carolina Supreme Court re-
manded the case to the Industrial Commission to consider whether
factors of age, education and work experience rendered claimant
totally incapacitated for work when considered with her fifty per-
cent incapacity due to injury.' The court stated:
[when] pre-existing conditions such as an employee's age, educa-
tion and work experience are such that an injury causes him a
greater degree of incapacity for work than the same injury would
cause in some other person, the employee must be compensated
for the incapacity which he or she suffers, and not for the degree
of disability which would be suffered by someone with superior
education or work experience or who is younger or in better
health. 2
The theory behind these decisions is that an employer takes an
employee as he is. 73
The cases involving the aggravation principle indicate that the
employer must compensate the employee for the entire disability
when a pre-existing condition combines with an occupational dis-
ease or injury by accident causing loss of wage earning capacity.
However, the courts had little opportunity to apply this principle
to occupational disease claims until the byssinosis victim came to
the forefront in North Carolina.
2. Apportionment of Damages in Lung Disease Claims
The North Carolina Supreme Court considered apportionment
of disability compensation involving chronic obstructive lung dis-
ease or byssinosis in several recent decisions. The court held in
68. Id. at 256, 189 S.E.2d at 806. Plaintiff was 61 years old, had a fifth grade
education and his occupational skillsextended only to hard labor which he was no
longer able to perform.
69. Id. at 255, 189 S.E.2d at 805.
70. 295 N.C. 527, 246 S.E.2d 743 (1978).
71. Id. at 533, 246 S.E.2d 743 (1978). Plaintiff was over 50 years old, was
somewhat obese, had an eighth grade education, was an unskilled laborer and had
a pre-existing arthritic condition.
72. Id. at 532, 246 S.E.2d at 746 (emphasis added).
73. Mabe v. North Carolina Granite Corp., 15 N.C. App. 253, 256, 189 S.E.2d
804, 807 (1972). For further analysis of the aggravation principle and age, educa-
tion and work experience see Note, Using Age Education and Work Experience
to Determine Disability, 15 WAKE FoREsT L. Rav. 570 (1979).
108 [Vol. 7:99
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each of these cases that compensation must be denied for the por-
tion of the disability due to non-occupational factors.74 Compensa-
tion could only be awarded for the portion of the disease caused by
the employment. 75
In the landmark case of Morrison v. Burlington Industries,70
the court addressed the dual causation issue and apportionment of
damages in an occupational disease case. Claimant suffered from
chronic obstructive lung disease which resulted in total incapacity
to earn wages.7 A doctor testified at the hearings before the Indus-
trial Commission that fifty to sixty percent of the claimant's disa-
bility was caused by occupational factors while forty percent was
caused by non-occupational factors.78 The Industrial Commission
found that claimant was totally incapacitated for work but that
she suffered only fifty-five percent partial disability.7 9 As a result,
claimant received an award for fifty-five percent permanent partial
disability.80
The supreme court affirmed the decision of the Industrial
Commission.8 The court held that "when a pre-existing, non-disa-
bling non-job-related disease or infirmity eventually causes an in-
capacity for work without any aggravation or acceleration of it by a
compensable accident or by an occupational disease, the resulting
incapacity so caused is not compensable."82 While the majority in-
sisted that the decision was in line with North Carolina precedent,
Justice Exum vigorously dissented, asserting that the majority ap-
plied an incorrect interpretation of the aggravation principle in the
74. Morrison v. Burlington Indus., 304 N.C. 1, 282 S.E.2d 458 (1981); Hansel
v. Sherman Textiles, 304 N.C. 44, 283 S.E.2d 101 (1981); Walston v. Burlington
Indus., 304 N.C. 670, 285 S.E.2d 822 (1982).
75. Id.
76. 304 N.C. 1, 282 S.E.2d 458 (1981). For a further discussion of this case
and its impact see Comment, Workers' Compensation- You Take (45% of) My
Breath Away-Morrison v. Burlington Industries, 4 CAM. L. REV. 107 (1981);
Note, Workers' Compensation-Apportionment of Disability Compensa-
tion-Morrison v. Burlington Industries, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 801 (1982).
77. Id. at 2, 282 S.E.2d at 461.
78. Id. at 7, 282 S.E.2d at 462.
79. Id. at 6, 7, 10, 282 S.E.2d at 463, 465.
80. Id. at 6, 282 S.E.2d at 463.
81. The court of appeals reversed the decision of the Industrial Commission
holding that a worker's incapacity to work could not be apportioned to other pre-
existing illnesses. Id. at 2, 282 S.E.2d at 461.
82. Id. at 18, 282 S.E.2d at 470.
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decision."
Decisions subsequent to Morrison affirmed the apportionment
rule applied in the case. In Hansel v. Sherman Textiles, 4 decided
the same day as Morrison, the plaintiff's byssinosis was partly re-
sponsible for her disability, and asthma, chronic bronchitis and
cigarette smoking were also partly responsible.8s The supreme
court remanded the decision to the Industrial Commission to make
further findings of fact concerning the percentages of disability
caused by occupational and non-occupational factors.8 6 Again, Jus-
tice Exum disagreed with the court's application of the aggravation
principle though concurring in the result."7
In Walston v. Burlington Industries," the court affirmed the
apportionment rule once again. Plaintiff's doctor was unable to as-
sign percentages regarding occupational and non-occupational fac-
tors contributing to her lung disease.8' The court found the evi-
dence insufficient to show that plaintiff suffered from an
occupational disease or that occupational factors aggravated or ac-
celerated any pre-existing condition. 90 The decision of the Indus-
trial Commission denying compensation was affirmed."'
Within this background of case law concerning occupational
disease, apportionment and aggravation, the North Carolina Su-
preme Court once again addressed the difficult causation issue fac-
ing the byssinosis victim in Rutledge v. Tultex Corp.IKings
83. Id. at 19, 24, 282 S.E.2d at 462, 473. Justice Exum felt that the aggrava-
tion principle was incorrectly applied by the majority.
The question is not how the occupational disease and the other infirmi-
ties are medically connected. The question is how they are connected vis-
a-via the worker's incapacity to work . . . . The aggravation principle
means. . . that if the occupational disease in combination or interaction
with pre-existing infirmities not in themselves sufficient to cause any in-
capacity for work, so aggravates the worker's physical condition that he
is then totally incapacitated for work, he is entitled to an award for total
incapacity.
Id. at 24-25, 282 S.E.2d at 474.
84. 304 N.C. 44, 283 S.E.2d 101 (1981).
85. Id. at 54, 283 S.E.2d at 107.
86. Id. at 58-59, 283 S.E.2d at 109.
87. Id. at 60, 283 S.E.2d at 110. Justice Exum called for the application of
the significant contribution standard later adopted in Rutledge. Id. at 63, 283
S.E.2d at 111-112.
88. 304 N.C. 670, 285 S.E.2d 822 (1982).
89. Id. at 678, 285 S.E.2d at 827.
90. Id. at 679, 285 S.E.2d at 827.
91. Id. 680, 285 S.E.2d at 828.
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Yarn.92
ANALYSIS
In Rutledge v. Tultex Corp./Kings Yarn,93 the North Carolina
Supreme Court held that chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
may be an occupational disease if:
(1) the employment exposed the worker to a greater risk of con-
tracting the disease than the public generally; and
(2) the worker's exposure to cotton dust significantly contrib-
uted to or was a significant causal factor in the disease's
development."'
In the majority opinion Justice Exum distinguished Morrison v.
Burlington Industries95 and subsequent apportionment cases96 on
evidentiary grounds. However, Justice Meyer in the dissent as-
serted that the majority specifically overruled Morrison and
adopted a new standard of review.7
By the majority's own admission, the standard adopted in
Rutledge would make the disease fully compensable even though
other non-occupational factors also significantly contributed to or
were significant causal factors in the disease's development.9 The
decision is significant because it liberalizes the law on occupational
disease claims, making causation easier to prove for victims of oc-
cupational disease.
A. Causation: Significant Contribution versus Apportionment
In Morrison, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that
when a claimant's total incapacity to earn wages was partially
caused by an occupational disease and partially caused by other
physical infirmities "not caused, accelerated or aggravated by an
occupational disease," only the portion caused by the occupational
92. 308 N.C. 85, 301 S.E.2d 359 (1983).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 101, 301 S.E.2d at 369.
95. 304 N.C. 1, 282 S.E.2d 458 (1981), discussed in Rutledge at 308 N.C. 95,
301 S.E.2d at 366.
96. Walston v. Burlington Indus., 304 N.C. 670, 285 S.E.2d 822 (1982), dis-
cussed in Rutledge at 308 N.C. at 107, 301 S.E.2d at 373; Hansel v. Sherman
Textiles, 304 N.C. 44, 283 S.E.2d 101 (1981), discussed in Rutledge at 308 N.C. at
97, 301 S.E.2d at 367.
97. 308 N.C. 85, 109, 301 S.E.2d 359, 374.
98. Id. at 107, 301 S.E.2d at 373.
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disease was compensable. 99 This decision significantly narrowed
the aggravation principle by apportioning damages between pre-
existing conditions and occupational conditions rather than award-
ing full disability compensation. Proof of causation became more
difficult because the worker had to prove the percentage of disabil-
ity caused by an occupational disease.
In the dissenting opinion Rutledge, Justice Meyer charged
that the majority reversed the apportionment principle established
in Morrison. He asserted that the dissenters in Morrison en-
couraged adoption of the significant contribution standard which
formed the basis of the Rutledge decision. 00
In Rutledge, Justice Exum denied the allegation that the ma-
jority reversed Morrison and distinguished the case on the evi-
dence presented.' 0 ' He drew a distinction between the cases by em-
phasizing that Mrs. Morrison's occupational disease was byssinosis
while Mrs. Rutledge's disease was chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease. 0 2 However, for purposes of compensation, this argument
may only be an exercise in semantics. 03 Although the etiology of
lung disease in textile workers is still debated, there is much sup-
port for the position that byssinosis and chronic obstructive pul-
monary disease are actually two stages of one disease syndrome,
byssinosis.104 Byssinosis may be defined as a dust-induced disease
characterized by initial acute responses followed by a stage of
chronic lung disease characterized by chronic airway obstruction.0 5
While chronic lung impairment may include factors that are both
occupational and non-occupational there can be little doubt that
exposure to respirable cotton dust contributes to the disease's de-
velopment. 00 Thus, a serious question remains concerning the im-
pact of the Rutledge decision on Morrison and the apportionment
rule.
99. 304 N.C. at 18, 282 S.E.2d at 470.
100. 308 N.C. at 111, 301 S.E.2d at 375. Justice Exum wrote the dissenting
opinion in Morrison, the concurring opinion in Hansel and the majority opinion
in Rutledge.
101. 308 N.C. at 97, 301 S.E.2d at 367.
102. Id. See supra note 5.
103. Bouhuys, et al, Epidemiology of Chronic Obstructive Lung Disease in a
Cotton Mill Community, Service Vol. 5 of Traumatic Medicine and Surgery for
the Attorney 607, reprinted from Lung-An International Journal on Lungs,
Airways and Breathing, 154(3): 167-86 (1977). See supra note 5.
104. Id. at 618.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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In his treatise on Workers' Compensation laws in the United
States, Professor Larson contends that the Rutledge decision effec-
tively overruled Morrison and its progeny. 10 An analysis of the
dissenting opinion in Morrison lends credence to this argument.
The dissenters in Morrison believed that the majority incor-
rectly applied the aggravation principle in that case.'10 The dis-
senters argued that the occupational disease need not be the sole
cause of the worker's incapacity to work in order to support an
award for full compensation. 10 9 When pre-existing infirmities inter-
acted with the disease to produce total incapacity for work, the
occupational disease should be fully compensable." 0 The dissent-
ers considered the significant contribution standard to be the cor-
rect legal principle applicable in the case."' By applying the signif-
icant contribution standard in Rutledge, the majority actually
adopted the dissenting opinion in Morrison.
In practical application, the Rutledge decision renders the
Morrison apportionment rule ineffective. The significant contribu-
tion standard eases the burden on an occupational disease claim-
ant seeking compensation for lung impairment. When the claimant
need only show that exposure to cotton dust significantly contrib-
uted to the development of lung disease, there is no longer a need
to meet the more difficult standard of proving the specific percent-
age of impairment caused by occupational exposure to disease
causing agents. Given the choice of the two standards, the Rut-
ledge standard is preferable from the perspective of a claimant at-
tempting to prove an occupational lung disease.
Decisions subsequent to Rutledge indicate that the North Car-
olina courts will continue to apply the significant contribution
standard without addressing the apportionment rule."' In Dowdy
v. Fieldcrest Mills," 3 the North Carolina Supreme Court found
that the plaintiff suffered from chronic obstructive pulmonary dis-
ease under the significant contribution standard. In dicta, the
court refused to recognize a distinction between byssinosis and
107. 1B LARSON § 41.64(c) (Supp. 1983).
108. 304 N.C. at 25, 282 S.E.2d at 474.
109. Id. at 24, 282 S.E.2d at 473.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 43, 282 S.E.2d at 484.
112. Clark v. American & Efird Mills, 66 N.C. App. 624, 311 S.E.2d 624
(1984); Swink v. Cone Mills, Inc., 65 N.C. App. 397, 309 S.E.2d 271 (1983); Dowdy
v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 308 N.C. 701, 304 S.E.2d 215 (1983).
113. Id.
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chronic obstructive pulmonary disease for purposes of
compensation:
[w]e think it unimportant here to determine whether byssinosis is
a particular type of chronic obstructive lung disease or a separate
disease often found in conjunction with or evolving from chronic
obstructive lung disease. For purposes of awarding workers' com-
pensation benefits, there is no practical difference between chron-
ic obstructive lung disease and byssinosis.1 4
Since the only distinction drawn between Rutledge and Morrison
by the Rutledge majority rested upon mere labelling of the dis-
eases, Dowdy would seem to be a significant departure. If the court
now accepts the contention that the diseases are essentially the
same for purposes of compensation, the apportionment rule is ef-
fectively overruled as contended by Professor Larson.
B. The Effect of Rutledge on Proving a Lung Disease Claim
The Rutledge decision is particularly significant in proving
causation in byssinosis claims. Under the apportionment rule med-
ical experts must assign percentages to disability caused by the
employment. 1 5 Due to the nature of the disease this is a difficult,
if not impossible, task to accurately perform. The percentage of
disability caused by the inhalation of cotton dust is virtually im-
possible to accurately prove because the effects of cotton dust, cig-
arette smoking, asthma and other lung impairments are indistin-
guishable. 1 6 Medical experts continue to disagree on the etiology
of byssinosis.
Furthermore, disability claims in lung disease cases must of
necessity be proven by circumstantial evidence including the de-
gree of exposure to cotton dust in employment, the degree of expo-
sure to other disease causing agents outside employment, and the
existence of a pre-existing condition.' 7 However, exposure to each
of these factors has been shown to effect individuals differently
and there is no method for determining the extent of damage
114. 308 N.C. at 712, 304 S.E.2d at 222.
115. See Rutledge v. Tultex Corp.IKings Yarn, 308 N.C. at 94, 301 S.E.2d at
366.
116. ATTORNEY'S TEXTBOOK 205E.20, 205E.30; see supra note 5. See also 1B
LARSON § 79.51(d).
117. Booker v. Duke Medical Center, 297 N.C. 458, 256 S.E.2d 189 (1979);
Rutledge v. Tultex Corp./Kings Yarn, 308 N.C. 85, 301 S.E.2d 359 (1983).
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caused by each. 18 Medical histories are inadequate because each
individual history varies, sometimes significantly.' 19 Thus, the as-
signment of percentages may be arbitrary when based upon these
factors and may fail to reflect actual disability.This causation problem is not limited to byssinosis claims but
exists in many occupational disease cases. Accidents usually arise
from a sudden identifiable event.1 20 Unlike accidents, many occu-
pational diseases develop gradually making the origin of the dis-
ease unclear. 21 Medical experts differ on the development and
causation involved in many diseases. Also, non-work-related fac-
tors may be involved in the etiology of a number of diseases.12 2
The effect of the Rutledge decision is to ease the burden of
proof concerning this difficult causation issue for lung disease
claimants. The significant contribution standard removes a very
difficult burden of proof placed on the claimant by the apportion-
ment rule. However, the standard does not remove the element of
causation necessary to any occupational disease claim. The claim-
ant must prove that occupational factors significantly contributed
to the development of the disease. Significant, as defined by the
majority in Rutledge, means "having or likely to have influenced or
effect: deserving to be considered: important, weighty, notable. 1 28
The result is that more byssinosis victims will be able to recover
for total disability when occupational and non-occupational factors
contribute to the development of disabling disease.
C. The Aggravation Principle
The argument that Rutledge was a departure from North Car-
olina precedent is credible when examined in light of the appor-
tionment cases, Morrison, Hansel and Walston. However, when
these cases are considered in connection with prior case law, it be-
comes clear that the apportionment rule established in Morrison
was the actual departure from precedent.
Under the aggravation principle, claimants were allowed total
disability compensation when death or disability was aggravated or
118. See supra notes 5 and 108.
119. Id.
120. 1B LARSON § 41.30 et seq.
121. Id. see also Booker v. Duke Medical Center, 297 N.C. 458, 256 S.E.2d
189 (1979).
122. 3 LARSON § 79-51(d).
123. 308 N.C. at 101, 301 S.E.2d at 370.
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accelerated by an accident or occupational disease. 24 Disability
was determined by the employee's inability to earn wages includ-
ing factors of age, education and work experience. The measure of
disability was not determined by a "normal" person standard.
Thus, when a pre-existing condition combined with an occupa-
tional disease or injury to produce disability, the entire resultant
disability was compensable. '2
Morrison severely limited the scope of the aggravation princi-
ple. Instead of placing the emphasis on aggravation or death or
disability, the emphasis was placed on medical aggravation of a
pre-existing condition.2 6 The medical relationship between pre-ex-
isting conditions and the occupational disease became the factual
determinant in Morrison. The relationship stressed by the cases
invoking the aggravation principle emphasized the effect of a pre-
existing condition and occupational disease or injury on the ability
of the claimant to earn wages.2 7
The significant contribution standard adopted in Rutledge
abandons the technical distinctions and interrelationships between
pre-existing conditions and occupational disease introduced in
Morrison. This decision once again focuses disability compensation
on the disease, the resultant disability and the ability or inability
of the claimant to earn wages. Thus, although Rutledge was a de-
parture from the rule established in Morrison, the significant con-
tribution standard is actually more in line with prior North Caro-
lina case law.
D. Policy Considerations
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Meyer argued that the legis-
lative intent of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act
was defeated by the significant contribution standard. 28 The Act
was intended to provide compensation only for those disabilities
caused by the employment. 129 The philosophy behind this princi-
124. See supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
126. Morrison v. Burlington Indus., 304 N.C. 1, 19, 282 S.E.2d 458, 473
(1981)(Exum, J. dissenting); see also note 84.
127. See supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
128. Rutledge v. Tultex Corp./Kings Yarn, 308 N.C. 85, 109, 301 S.E.2d 359,
374 (1983).
129. Vause v. Vause Farm Equip. Co., 233 N.C. 88, 92, 63 S.E.2d 173, 175
(1951).
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ple was that industry must only pay for its own wreckage. 3 ' Con-
sidering this philosophy in isolation, the apportionment rule limit-
ing liability of the employer was consistent with this philosophy.
However, there were other policy considerations behind the Act.
The Workers' Compensation Act was also designed to ensure a
speedy and reliable remedy for employees.' At its inception, the
Act was designed to ease the burdens of the common law system
on the parties. Thus, the Act contained mutual concessions on the
part of employer and employee. The employer agreed to pay some
claims where there was no pre-existing liability at common law in
exchange for paying smaller awards. The employee agreed to ac-
cept smaller awards in exchange for simplicity and speed in the
decision making process. 2 To this end, the Act should be liberally
construed to prevent a narrow, technical interpretation from pre-
cluding recovery.' 3 In other words, the Act is intended to strike a
workable balance between the employer and employee.
The significant contribution standard strikes this balance be-
tween employer and employee in a manner consistent with the
purposes of the Act. The standard removes an unbearable burden
of proof placed on the claimant by the apportionment rule. At the
same time, the standard does not increase the burden on industry
to the extent that minor factors contributing to the development of
occupational diseases mandate recovery. The claimant must still
prove that the occupational factors significantly contributed to the
development of the disease. The element of causation required by
the Act is preserved without allowing a difficult and unworkable
standard to defeat recovery. This is consistent with the liberal con-
struction theory applied by the North Carolina courts in workers'
compensation claims.
CONCLUSION
Rutledge v. Tultex Corp./Kings Yarn was indeed a departure
by the North Carolina Supreme Court from the precedent estab-
lished in Morrison, Hansel and Walston, the apportionment cases.
Rutledge has rendered the apportionment approach to lung disease
130. Id.
131. Barnhardt v. Yellow Cab Co., 266 N.C. 419, 427, 146 S.E.2d 479, 484
(1966).
132. Vause v. Vause Farm Equip. Co., 233 N.C. 88, 91, 63 S.E.2d 173, 176
(1951).
133. Stevenson v. City of Durham, 281 N.C. 300, 188 S.E.2d 281 (1972).
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claims useless and has in effect overruled those decisions. However,
a thorough examination of the North Carolina Workers' Compen-
sation law on occupational disease indicates that Morrison and its
progeny were departures from North Carolina practice and prece-
dent. The significant contribution standard established in Rut-
ledge once again places the emphasis upon the worker's resultant
disability rather than on complex interrelationships between pre-
existing conditions and work related exposure.
The apportionment rule places too severe a burden upon occu-
pational disease claimants seeking compensation for lung disease.
The apportionment rule is difficult to administer due to the dis-
puted origin of many occupational diseases. Many medical experts
may be reluctant to assign percentages to disability, particularly in
byssinosis cases where the effects of occupational and non-occupa-
tional factors are virtually indistinguishable. At best, assignment of
percentages to disability in these cases is speculative and arbitrary.
Protracted litigation would result in the attempt to assign percent-
ages to disability.
By adopting the significant contribution standard Rutledge,
the North Carolina Supreme Court recognized the difficulties cre-
ated by the apportionment rule. To cure the inequities the rule
created, the court adopted a feasible alternative. The court has
found a workable standard which preserves the purpose and focus
of the Workers' Compensation Act. Considering the nature of bys-
sinosis, the etiology and the unknown elements of the disease, this
standard is the better alternative. Thus, even though this decision
was a departure from precedent, the North Carolina Supreme
Court has corrected the error committed when the apportionment
rule was established.
Sharon L. Hartman
118 [Vol. 7:99
20
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 6
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol7/iss1/6
